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The Merits of Antimerger Policy-
A Reply to Professor Galbraith
Donald F. Turner
Professor John Kenneth Galbraith has recently charged that Ameri-
can antimerger policy is out of date. He has argued that large size and
high concentration lead to increases in planning efficiency; thus, since
efficient planning is desirable, he asserts that large size and high con-
centration should be encouraged. Mr. Turner, in his reply to Professor
Galbraith, feels that while their opinions about antitrust policy may be
irreconcilable, their differences concerning American industry rest on
questions of fact and may be debated as such. Mr. Turner therefore at-
tacks each of Galbraith's two major premises in turn, and concludes that
neither is supported by the factual data presently available. Mr. Turner
argues that large size and high concentration lead instead to slack and
inefficiency. The author concludes that, while criticism of present policy
serves the worthwhile end of forcing reevaluation, present antimerger
policy will remain unless its critics can point to persuasive factual support
for their intellectual theorizations.
I. INTRODUCTION3 SHOULD LIKE to discuss American antimerger1 policy -
whether it appears to make sense, or, as an ample supply of
critics maintain, it is antiquated or just plain foolish. American
antimerger policy has since 19502 become rather strict. It is based
upon the traditional economic
view that when a market be-
THE AUTHoR: DONALD F. TURNER comes high ly concentrated
(B.A., Northwestern University; LL.B., or oligopolistic in structure,
Yale University) is Assistant Attorney the intensity and effectiveness
General in charge of the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Department of Justice in of competition - particularly
Washington, D.C. price competition - are likely
to diminish. Each of the ma-
jor sellers bulks so large in the
market that a price cut by one cannot be ignored by the others, but
must immediately be matched. Price cutting therefore does not pay
and tends to be avoided; "parallel policies of mutual advantage, not
competition... emerge. '
Our antimerger policy - which reflects our hostility to concen-
tration - by and large does not allow two substantial viable com-
' Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
2 Section 7 of the Clayton Act was amended in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Anti-
merger Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
3 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964).
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peting companies to merge. This position was recently upheld by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,4 a case
that involved a merger between two relatively substantial grocery
chains in the Los Angeles market - Von's with approximately 4.7
percent of total retail sales in 1958 and Shopping Bag with approxi-
mately 4.2 percent. The aggregate market share of the eight larg-
est chains in the Los Angeles market - a group which included
Von's and Shopping Bag - had risen from 33.7 percent in 1948
to 40.9 percent 10 years later.
In the Supreme Court, the Government argued that a merger
between direct competitors is presumptively unlawful, even in a
market still relatively unconcentrated, if (1) the market is threat-
ened with undue concentration and (2) the challenged merger sub-
stantially increases market concentration. The Government agreed
that the precise impact of the increase in concentration effected by
the merger upon the competitive health of the Los Angeles market
could not be gauged. Indeed, we conceded, it might be negligible.
We pointed out, however, that the merger moved a market tending
toward undue concentration a pronounced step further in that direc-
tion, and that only a few more steps of comparable magnitude would
be necessary to make concentration so great that competition would
almost certainly be weakened. Antimerger policy would be ineffec-
tive, we urged, if we had to await such further changes. The Su-
preme Court agreed with our position, but not everybody else does.
The major argument against the strong antimerger/anticoncen-
tration policy that I have described is based upon the proposition
that technological and other economic developments make large
size and industrial concentration not only necessary but also desir-
able. Professor John Kenneth Galbraith believes that antitrust
enforcement is out of date.5 He supports his conclusion with two
homonymic arguments. First, he contends that the larger a firm
is, the more effectively it can plan; we must, therefore, tolerate giant
sized firms in order to have efficient planning. Second, he believes
that firms that can control prices can plan more effectively; we
must, therefore, tolerate concentrated industries in order to produce
efficient planning. There is nothing startlingly new in these propo-
sitions. As long ago as 1889 Professor David Wells of Harvard
wrote:
4384 U.S. 270 (1966).
5 See Six Reith Lectures by Professor Galbraith, BBC, London, England, Nov.-Dec.
1966, in 76 LIsTmnR & BBC TELEVISION REV. Nos. 1964-69 (1966); J.K. GAL-
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Society has practically abandoned - and from the very necessity
of the case has got to abandon, unless it proposes to war against
progress and civilization - the prohibition of industrial concen-
trations and combinations. The world demands abundance of
commodities, and demands them cheaply; and experience shows
that it can have them only by the employment of great capital
upon the most extensive scale.6
And, in 1899, George Gunton wrote that "the concentration of pro-
duction capital" is "the most effective if not the only means of reme-
dying... [al constant social calamity." The most recent source of
this type of criticism, however, is not the United States, but England.
For, like Ovid in exile at Tomi, Professor Galbraith has been writ-
ing in London. And last winter the BBC's listeners heard the dis-
tinguished successor of Wells assert that "oligopoly is combined, in
one of the more disconcerting contradictions of economic theory,
with efficient production, expansive output, and prices that are gen-
erally thought rather favorable to the public."'  Stating his belief
that large size and concentration are needed to achieve planning
efficiency, he concluded that "modern antimonopoly and antitrust
laws are a charade."9
I disagree with Professor Galbraith's view that changes in the
economy require us to accept giant firms and concentrated industries
in order to achieve industrial efficiency. While I, too, believe that
the industrial system is experiencing change, I do not think those
changes so profound as to require abandonment of our traditional
support for competition; and, in my view, the evidence today, as in
the past, supports the proposition that giant size and concentration
within an industry ordinarily lead to worse market performance
rather than better - where market performance is viewed broadly
to include efficiency in the production and marketing units, price-
cost relations, and technical progress. Let me examine each of Pro-
fessor Galbraith's arguments in turn.
II. THE SIZE-EFFICIENCY CORRELATION
DOES IT ExIsT?
Professor Galbraith first contends that changes in the structure
of the economy have significantly increased the size that a firm must
BRAITH, THE NW INDuSTRIAL STATE (1967). See also J.K. GALBRAITH, AMERICaN
CAPITALISM, THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING PowER (1952).
6 DA. WELLS, RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES 74 (1889).
7G. GUNTON, TRusTs AND THE PUBLIC 77 (1899).
8 Lecture by Galbraith, supra note 5, Control of Prices and People, 76 LISTENER &
BBC TELEVISION REV. 763 (1966).
9ld. at 794.
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achieve in order to plan and to operate efficiently. Since in a grow-
ing economy the standard for judging giant size must be periodi-
cally updated - so that what was regarded as giant size 10 years
ago, much less the turn of the century, is probably inappropriate
today - let me discuss this proposition in relation to both changes
in the size of the economy and in the size of individual markets.
If such changes as Professor Galbraith alleges have occurred,
they must have taken place in methods of production, marketing,
finance, research and development, or in management operations.
I am not aware, however, of changes in any of these areas that would
support Professor Galbraith's conclusion that we must tolerate giant
firms for the sake of efficiency.
Professor Galbraith does not identify any transformation of
methods of production, marketing, or finance that have significantly
increased the minimum size that a firm must obtain in order to be
efficient. This is not to say that there have been no changes in
these areas. To the contrary, there have been many changes in pro-
duction, marketing, and finance that have affected the minimum
efficient size of many firms. Indeed, many of these changes may
have made it easier for small firms to be efficient. Moreover, al-
most 10 years ago Professor Bain, who studied the matters of pro-
duction, marketing, and finance thoroughly, concluded: "It is not
true that existing degrees of business concentration are adequately
explained simply as the result of adjustments to attain maximum
efficiency in production and distribution."1  Professor Bain's state-
ment appears to be no less true of the economy today.
Thus, the major reason for believing that a strong anticoncen-
tration policy is as appropriate today as it ever was is that there have
been no evident economic changes in America over the past years
in the direction of "natural monopoly" or "natural oligopoly." This
is simply to say that there is no greater need to have industries com-
posed of one or a few firms in order to have firms big enough to be
efficient. It is, of course, important to allow firms of sufficient size
to realize economies of scale, and it is clear that such economies have
dictated larger sized companies in some industries than once were
required. But the markets for most products have been growing
as well - often at least as fast - so that by and large there has
been no decline in the number of efficient competitors that indus-
tries have room to accommodate. What economic evidence we
10 J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 185 (1959). See also id. ch. 5; J. BAIN,
BARRIERS TO NEW COMPEtITION ch. 3 (1956).
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have on the subject shows that in America many firms in concen-
trated industries are far larger than necessary to produce goods at
the lowest possible cost. If there were continuing economies of
scale, one would expect the largest firms in industries to have higher
profit rates than their smaller brothers. But the evidence shows
that while average profit rates increase as the size of firms grows to
approximately $5 million in assets, there is no correlation between
size and profit rates beyond that point.1
Nor do we have any reason to believe, though it is repeatedly
asserted as if it were obvious gospel truth, that there is any relation
between size and technological progress as would warrant any sig-
nificant constraints on antimerger policy. Several empirical studies
have tested the validity and dimensions of the proposition that both
the amount and the efficiency of research directly correlates to size
of firm. These studies tend to show that many more large firms
(with 5000 or more employees) do research than do small firms
(with less than 500 employees). But once we get a firm large
enough to do organized research at all, there are no evident econo-
mies of scale either in research for size of firm or in research -pro-
ductivity for any given amount spent.'"
It is of course true that large firms are more likely to have re-
search operations than small firms. Nevertheless, among firms
which do have research organizations, smaller firms tend to spend
proportionately as much as their larger counterparts, as is true in
the petroleum and glass industries, and in some instances they spend
more. In a study of the patent behavior of 448 firms selected from
Fortune's list of the largest 500 industrial corporations in 1955, the
author concluded that "the evidence does not support the hypothesis
that corporate bigness is especially favorable to high inventive out-
put."' 3  As for the efficiency of the research done, another author
concluded that "[i]n most industries the productivity of an R&D
[research and development] program of given scale seems to be
lower in the largest firms than in somewhat smaller firms;"'4 and
"1 Alexander, The Effect of Size of Manufacturing Corporation on the Distribution
of the Rate of Return, 31 REV. OF ECON. & STATSTICS 229 (1949). See also C. FER-
GUSON, A MAcROEcONOMIc THEORY OF WORKABLE COMPETITION 172-75 (1964).
12 Worley, Industrial Research and the New Competition, 69 J. PoL. ECON. 183
(1961).
13 Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented
Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097, 1114 (1965).
14 Mansfield, Industrial Research and Development Expenditures: Determinants,
Prospects, and Relation to Size of Firm and Inventive Output, 72 J. POL. ECON. 319,
338 (1964).
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in a further study it was found that diseconomies of scale in the
pharmaceutical industry were encountered in even moderate firm
sizes. 5 These studies support the conclusion that for efficient re-
search and development we may need large firms - ranging per-
haps from $10 million to $100 million in assets depending on the
industry - but they cast doubt, to say the least, upon the need for
giants and supergiants.
Finally, I do not believe that changes in the area of manage-
ment control require us to allow larger firms in order to achieve
that efficiency in planning that Professor Galbraith desires. Nor-
mally one would expect that after a certain minimum size is reached,
firms become less rather than more efficient in terms of manage-
ment. The reasons for this were well stated by Professor Kenneth
Boulding, who is now president-elect of the American Economic
Association. He stated:
There is a great deal of evidence that almost all organizational
structures tend to produce false images in the decision-maker, and
that the larger and more authoritarian the organization, the better
the chance that its top decision-makers will be operating in purely
imaginary worlds. This perhaps is the most fundamental reason
for supposing that there are ultimately diminishing returns to
scale.16
Professor Oliver Williamson, who served as my Special Eco-
nomics Assistant, has developed analytical support for this argu-
ment that problems of maintaining control in hierarchial organi-
zations become progressively more difficult as size increases.' He
goes on to point out, however, that as the ability of a firm to process
data increases, the size of the most efficient managerial unit also in-
creases. Since the digital computer has vastly increased the amount
of data that a firm can process, it may be that Professor Galbraith
relies on advances in the computer field as the basis for the changes
in efficient firm size that he alleges. But, while the digital com-
puter indeed has by and large increased the efficient size of the
managerial unit, a large number of complex decisions far beyond
the present reach of the computer remain. Top management must
continue to rely extensively on the organization below it for the in-
formation it obtains and for the execution of its plans. In sum,
15 Comanor, Research and Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 47
REv. OF EcoN. & STATISTICS 182 (1965).
16 Boulding, The Economics of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Economics, 56
AMER. ECON. REV. 1, 8 (1966).
17 Williamson, Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size, 75 J. POL. ECON. 123
(1967).
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while computers may be responsible for important changes in man-
agement, there is no indication that these changes have been of such
magnitude as to necessitate giant sized firms.
Thus, in every area - production, finance, marketing, research
and development, and management - we are unable to detect
changes of a sort that would require us to accept the proposition
that giant size can typically be justified on efficiency grounds. We
do not see any indication that giant size is now necessary to achieve
efficiency in planning. We continue to believe therefore, that anti-
trust policy does not deprive the economy of any significant benefits
when it prevents the creation of giant size firms. Surely in the face
of all this the least that can be said is that the burden of proof is on
those who claim that there is a sufficiently important relation be-
tween size on the one hand and progressiveness or efficiency in plan-
ning on the other to warrant a drastic cutback in antimerger policy.
I see no indication that Professor Galbraith has sustained this bur-
den.
Ill. THE CONCENTRATION-EFFICIENCY
CORRELATION - DOES IT EXIST?
I have been talking about the relation of efficiency and pro-
gressiveness to the size of business firms. Professor Galbraith also
appears to suggest that not only size, but high concentration of firms
within an industry - a concentration high enough to give them
some control over price - is beneficial, and perhaps essential, to
efficient mass production, and, in particular, to efficient planning.
Here too, however, the evidence available shows no correlation be-
tween high concentration and the principal elements of economic
performance - price, cost, and progressiveness. To the contrary,
a recent review of all previous studies in this area suggests that, in
the United States at least, there is a direct correlation not with lower
prices but with higher prices: the gap between prices and costs is
greater in concentrated industries.
While there is no decisive evidence on the question of the rela-
tion of concentration to efficiency at any given time, there is noth-
ing substantial to refute the strong a priori case that high concen-
tration will tend to produce slack and inefficiency. I will only cite
a study which showed that between 1899 and 1937 the industries
in which labor productivity increased most sharply were those char-
acterized by declining concentration.18 Moreover, industries of low
18See Stigler, Industrial Organization and Economic Progress, in THE STATE OF
THE SOCIAL SCINCcEs 269 (L. White ed. 1956). But cf. id. at 278.
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concentration showed better performance than those with high.
Since much research and innovation is directed at lowering costs,
thus leading to higher levels of output per man-hour, these studies
suggest that increased concentration leads to less innovation rather
than more. Thus, I repeat, there is no reason for us to believe that
our traditional concern for market structure - our traditional ef-
fort to prevent undue concentration - deserves to be discarded.
In any event, Professor Galbraith does not make clear just how
increased concentration and control over price are meant to improve
planning efficiency. Since the prices which a firm would receive in
a market with unchanging demand would remain constant whether
or not that firm had market control, the type of price control for
which Galbraith argues would only be necessary in a market where
demand for a product changes. However, if prices in such a market
are held constant, shifting demand will lead to shifts in the amount
of the product produced. Thus, if prices are held steady in the man-
ner that Galbraith seems to think desirable, output would bear the
entire burden of shifts in demand. This result has disturbing im-
plications for employment, efficient use of plant facilities, planning
of production, and so forth. Most economists would prefer that
prices also be made to bear some of the burden of shifts in demand
by being adjusted in accordance with changing demand conditions.
And I might add that most businessmen also seem reluctant to main-
tain price stability at all costs. Thus, even in industries in which
list prices are unchanging, we often find that the prices of actual
transactions do reflect variations in demand. This fact indicates
that price shares some of the burden of adapting to market varia-
bility.
If Professor Galbraith is arguing that increased concentration
allows both prices and output to remain steady despite shifting de-
mand, I doubt very much that he is correct. He claims that when
sales begin to fall, firms can respond by increasing promotional ac-
tivities; that is to say, they can spend more money on advertising
and thus keep demand for their products high. But, if the strategy
that Professor Galbraith suggests works in an industry in which
giant size exists, it should presumably display the stability that Pro-
fessor Galbraith has in mind. Yet even in the automobile industry
we have recently seen considerable change in industry output and
effective auto prices. Moreover, since advertising and similar pro-
motional efforts work well only with consumer goods, Professor
Galbraith's argument does not apply to the producer goods sector
ANTIMERGER POLICY
at all. In any event, it is not clear why it is desirable to pursue so
singlemindedly the goal of output and price stability.
Of course, Professor Galbraith may only be saying that concen-
trated industries are less subject to the vagaries of the market place
than are industries with a large number of smaller firms. Even if
this is true, however, no one is proposing that all industry structures
should consist of a large number of small firms. Most efficiencies,
including efficiencies in planning, can ordinarily be achieved by
firms that are large but not giant size. High concentration of the
order proposed by Professor Galbraith is rarely needed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even if Galbraith were right in believing that giant size and
high concentration help firms plan more efficiently, he does not
indicate the extent to which planning efficiency is improved, and
therefore, he does not make clear whether the game is worth the
candle. I have no reason to believe that any increase in planning
efficiency that great size and concentration may create could out-
weigh the considerable harm caused by their effect in limiting com-
petition - harm which may take the form of higher prices,
diseconomies of control, and lower rates of innovation.
To summarize, Professor Galbraith's basic argument is that both
large size and industrial concentration are needed for greater effi-
ciency. My criticism of that argument is that, at least as applied to
the American economy, it not only seems unsupported but what
evidence we have points in the opposite direction.
Finally, Professor Galbraith's statement that antitrust enforce-
ment is a "charade" implies that the antitrust laws are enforced pri-
marily against small firms while the large ones are left alone. As
I pointed out in my testimony, 9 it is more difficult under present
law to bring a case attacking existing concentration in an industry
than to bring one seeking to prevent further concentration via
merger. This difficulty stems in part from the fact that most exist-
ing concentration would have to be attacked as a form of "monopo-
lization" made illegal by section 2 of the Sherman Act,2" and it has
not yet been held that this section applies in industries which are
dominated by several firms rather than only one. On the other
19 Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 28-30 (June 29, 1967).
20 15 U.S.C. 5 2 (1964).
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hand, there is no such limitation on the application of the Clayton
Act, which prevents mergers that may substantially lessen competi-
tion.21 However, the fact that it is more difficult to attack existing
concentration than it is to prevent future concentration obviously
provides no justification for allowing firms to make anticompetitive
mergers and to turn industries -that are not now concentrated into
industries that are concentrated.
I am not aware of any other way in which antitrust policy might
be said to discriminate in favor of large firms. It is possible that
Professor Galbraith believes that large firms can more easily with-
stand antitrust enforcement because it may be easier for a large firm
which enjoys a substantial profit advantage over its smaller rivals
to expand internally rather than through merger. The economic
evidence, however, does not support the proposition that internal
expansion is easier for a large firm than a small one. Ability to
generate or attract capital for expansion depends primarily on prof-
its, yet there is no indication that large firms enjoy a profit advan-
tage. Professor Sidney Alexander's 1949 study revealed that large
firms do not earn a higher rate of profit than their medium-sized
rivals.' He found that average profit rates increased as firm size
grew to approximately the $5 million total asset mark, but that once
this level was reached profit rates were constant or even tended
slightly downward. Professor C. E. Ferguson reports that this lack
of correlation between firm size and profit rate has continued to
hold since then.2" -Thus, although large firms ordinarily have larger
absolute profits than their medium-sized rivals, they possess no rela-
tive advantage.
Obviously my reading of the changing industrial scene and my
understanding of antitrust policy differ from those of Professor Gal-
braith. Our differences about antitrust policy may be irreconcilable.
Our differences about the industrial scene, however, rest upon ques-
tions of fact. Unless evidence is forthcoming that strongly contro-
verts that which I have reviewed above, I shall hold to my judgment
that the benefits of reconstructing American industry in terms of
giant sized firms are largely imaginary, while the costs of such a
policy are very real. Thus, although the Antitrust Division is sensi-
tive to the importance of reexamining periodically whether our
21 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
2 2 Alexander, supra note 11.
23 C. FERGUsON, supra note 11.
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ideas about the shape of the economy are accurate - and observa-
tions such as those of Professor Galbraith perform the useful func-
tion of making us do this sooner rather than later - at the present
time we have no intention of accepting his view that giant size is
beneficial, nor of accepting his implication that antitrust policy is
out of date.
